Smart contract audits get the attention, but most Web3 products we've seen get compromised somewhere else entirely key management, wallet infrastructure, or an API that was never meant to be public-facing but ended up that way.
A perfectly audited smart contract doesn't protect a product whose backend leaks a private key, whose custody integration has an overly broad permission scope, or whose admin panel was deployed without authentication because it was "just for internal use." Web3 products inherit every normal web application risk and add on-chain, irreversible consequences on top a mistake here isn't a rollback, it's a permanent public record.
Custody providers are chosen on their actual deposit, withdrawal, and wallet-segregation model, not just brand recognition the difference shows up in cost and flexibility later.
Services that touch wallets or on-chain actions get exactly the scope they need a compromised API key should never be enough to move funds.
Users hold their own keys wherever the product allows it, so a breach of TieTech-built infrastructure doesn't mean a breach of user funds.
Where identity needs to be verifiable on-chain, it's linked to a wallet without exposing the underlying personal data a smart contract can check status, not read a passport.
Encryption, rate limiting, dependency hardening, and audit logging apply to blockchain infrastructure exactly as they do to any other production system Web3 isn't an exception to security discipline, it's a reason to apply it more carefully.
Smart contract security is necessary but not sufficient the products we build treat custody, key management, and infrastructure access as equally critical, because that's where real Web3 breaches actually happen.